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Who Won The Great War? 

ji . 

The Revelations of the late 

CORNELIUS VAN TROMP 

Turned the Tide of 

THE GREAT WAR 
The Second Day of May, 1917 

And Made Possible 

THE VICTORY AT SEA 

and 

THE VICTORY ON LAND 



German Invocation: 

'The New Convoy System — Gott Straffe the Man 

Who Proposed it." 



Copyrighted, 1921 
By W. R. HINSDALE 



I THE LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS 
WASHINGTON 



T 






PROLOGUE 

The New Convoy System, devised by William Russell Hinsdale 
of Orange, New Jersey, May 2nd, 1917, as an aggressive warfare 
against the German Submarines under the "Van Tromp Revela- 
tions," was described by the British Admiralty Board as a "New 
Science of accuracy and skill and without its loyal co-operation 
the enemy's submarine campaign must inevitably have attained 
its object." 

Glaucus, an officer of high rank in the United States Navy 
has written an interesting analysis of the situation at that time. 
It will be noted that he, and all other writers quoted herein, have 
ascribed the winning of the Great War to this new science of 
accuracy and skill, extolled by the British Admiralty Board. 

From the report of The Ship Protective Committee of the 
Naval Consulting Board of The United States, organized in 1915, 
Mr. Thomas A. Edison, President : 

"There is no question that the most effective thing developed 
during the Great War for protecting vessels was the New Convoy 
System. 

"The safeguarding of vessels by torpedo-boat destroyers was 
very efficient and with a sufficient number of destroyers, practically 
complete immunity from submarine attack was had." 



cms visir* 



NOTE: — For a clear understanding of the crises of May 1st, 1917, 
as met by the Van Tromp Revelations of May 2nd, 1917, 
observe the dates respectively quoted herein. 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 3 

The American Who Baited 

The German Submarine 



BY DELT EDWARDS 



(COPYRIGHT, 1919, BY THE N. Y. HERALD CO. 

War time secrets guarded carefully for more than two years 
by President Wilson, Secretary Daniels, David Lloyd George, 
Arthur J. Balfour and other high officials of the American and 
British navies are now revealed, disclosing that the Man Who 
Baited the German Submarine was an American — William Russell 
Hinsdale, of Orange, N. J. Mr. Hinsdale is a consulting engineer 
and metallurgist and well known in New Jersey and New York. 

One month after the United States entered the war American, 
British and French officials in Washington were admitting publicly 
that the submarine situation was desperate. More than one million 
tons of shipping had been destroyed in April. Four hundred 
thousand tons had been sunk in one week. The U-boats were 
destroying and disabling more vessels than the combined efforts 
of Great Britian and America could offset. Every practical and 
scientific means suggested had been tried but found of no avail. 
The situation was growing worse daily. 

France and England were urging the United States to send 
her troops to the battlefields. President Wilson favored it. The 
American General Staff advised against it. No such troop trans- 
portation ever had been attempted, and now the submarine stood 
a solid barrier against safe communication. 

Starting the war 

On May 2, 1917, according to a series of communications which 
Mr Hinsdale has just been permitted to make public, the Orange 
engineer wrote to President Wilson explaining how the hopeless 
defensive warfare against the submarine could be turned into an 
aggressive, successful one. He knew the simplest secret. It lay 
in the weakness and limitations of the submarine. The undersea 
boat could not survive a six or eight inch shell exploded above, 
below or close beside it. The burst of the shell in the non-com- 
pressible water had the effect of driving a column of water like 
a steel shaft into the hull of the boat. Mr. Hinsdale was familiar 
with these limitations, and years before had helped Simon 
Lake launch his submarine enterprise, and, moreover, the German 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

submarine was an exact copy of its prototype, the American craft, 
for about fifteen years ago Mr. Lake had gone abroad to sell his 
craft to the German government, and Wilhelmstrasse, with chara- 
teristic astuteness, put off the purchase and retained the blueprints. 
Mr. Hinsdale, adapting the new convoy system, to the limita- 
tions of the submarine, suggested to President Wilson that the 
whole undersea campaign should be reversed. He recommended 
that the submarine be sought, not evaded; that a bait in the shape 
of large numbers of ships moving in convoys properly protected 
by destroyers should be sent out ; that the submarines should be 
tempted into the net and there destroyed with much more ease 
than they had been destroying. 

The Method Simple 

The very next day, and twenty-four hours after officials of all 
the allied nations had taken a very gloomy view of the situation, 
Secretary Daniels announced that the submarine would be met 
"in a direct way." He asserted that he could not go into the details 
of the method, because by so doing he would be giving away the 
scheme to the Germans. The simplicity of the new method was one 
which would have been understood in a moment. Almost im- 
mediately after Secretary Daniels' announcement the first Ameri- 
can destroyer flotilla was sent to Europe, arriving in Queenstown 
May 16. Within a few weeks the U-boats were scurrying out 
for the bait. Then came swift destruction. The back of the 
submarine peril was broken and the American troops swarmed 
across the seas by hundreds of thousands with a degree of 
safety that was marvelous. The whole campaign of frightfulness 
was changed almost over night. 

For Germany, when America entered the war, was gloating, 
and well could gloat, over the victories of her undersea navy. She 
had staked practically the outcome of the war on her ability to 
choke off supplies to England and France, and the supplies were 
slowing up. She felt so confident that she risked the entry of 
the United States on the throw of the submarine dice. Even with 
America in, a little more submarine success, by which she would 
prevent the transportation of any considerable number of troops, 
would have meant practically a severance of the lines of communi- 
cation, for the outcome of the world war now hung on the weight 
that America could throw into the balance. Germany gloried in 
the increased sinkings, from a mere 50,000 tons a month to close 
on to a million. She was beginning to glory in the deaths of 
American soldiers and British soldiers who became the victims of 
her U-boats. She openly boasted that the submarines were winning 
the war. 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 5 

And in the words of no abler judge than Rear Admiral William 
S. Sims, commanding the American naval forces in European 
waters : — 

"When we arrived in April, 1917, the Central Powers were 
winning the war, whether you knew it or not. There were 
700,000 to 800,000 tons of shipping being lost each month and we 
did not know how to stop it. 

The Beresford Warning 

Recalling some of the more important conferences on the 
submarine immediately after the United States declared war, on 
May 1, Admiral Lord Beresford, speaking in London, voiced the 
appalling situation. He complained of the incompleteness of the 
official returns on the sinkings. He declared that he was inclined 
to risk the penalties of the Defense of the Realm act and tell the 
people the truth that they might realize the gravity of the situa- 
tion. The same day British naval experts, accompanying a com- 
mission headed by Foreign Secretary Balfour in Washington, were 
impressing upon the American government the importance of 
moving as speedily as possible to stay the destruction. The 
French naval authorities were equally pessimistic. 

That same day, May 1, before Mr. Hinsdale's letters were 
written, the situation engaged the attention not only of President 
Wilson but of a conference arranged by Secretary of State Lansing. 
This was attended by Mr. Balfour, Sir George Foster, acting 
Minister to Canada ; Admiral de Chair, Sir Richard Crawford and 
others. Lord Eustace Percy, British trade expert, said : — 

"The seriousness of the situation is shown by the fact that 
forty British vessels were sunk in the third week of April. The 
balance of the situation is the tonnage the United States can 
supply. But even the present rate of production of the United 
States and Great Britian does not equal the percentage of losses 
caused by submarine depredations. The output of merchant ships 
in the United States must be increased if the submarine menace 
is to be overcome." 

In the afternoon of May 2, when Mr. Hinsdale was penning 
his first communication to President Wilson, the extreme gravity 
of the situation was being discussed at a meeting of the Cabinet in 
Washington. Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, whose 
able and outspoken counsel was regarded most highly by the 
President, made the startling declaration to the State Councils of 
Defense that 400,000 tons of shipping had been destroyed by sub- 
marines in a previous week. At that rate, he said, it meant that 




WILLIAM RUSSELL HINSDALE 
Date of Writing The Van Tromp Revelations 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 7 

Germany would send to the bottom 2,000,000 tons of shipping in 
the month — twice the amount that even the optimistic Berlin 
Admiralty started out to sink. 

Secretary Lansing Quoted 

Secretary Lansing himself, prone to talk openly and freely on 
few occasions, made the observation : — 

"The people might as well wake up to the fact that the situa- 
tion is serious." 

Secretary Daniels, watching the submarine peril continually, 
said the navy had fully realized the seriousness of the menace for 
a long time and that with the coming of spring and longer days 
the loss of tonnage was steadily increasing. 

"Germany appears determined to sink every ship she can in 
the barred zone," he said. "There can be no question about the 
seriousness of the menace. Our problem is to find something to 
counteract it. This we are endeavoring to do. For many weeks 
American Scientists have been at work on the problem. A large 
number of new devices have been tested. Most of them, at least 
eight out of every ten, have been found worthless. Every device 
that shows any promise is given further rigid tests." 

Then he added : — 

"Up to date nothing has been evolved which solves the pro- 
blem presented by the submarine." 

Herbert Hoover, returning from Europe, said : — "The increas- 
ing sinking by submarines in the last eight weeks shows the 
situation. It is serious, you can make sure of that." 

By this time the menace had grown so that Germany was 
jubilant over the declarations and admissions. Her U-boats became 
practically surface boats with almost a free hand. They were 
increasing their cruising radius, and reports already had been 
received in Washington of 400-foot submarines with 6-inch guns. 
They were said to be cruising off the Azores, a thousand miles 
out in the Atlantic, and it was only a matter of progression before 
they would reach the Atlantic coast. Frequently U-boats hovered 
around in the ocean, waiting for supply ships, replenishing their 
provisions and fuel at will. Lying on the surface in comparative 
security, they took enormus toll. They sank their victims with 
their guns, instead of being compelled to launch the more or less 
uncertain torpedo. Sometimes they were engaged at destruction 
for hours. It was of no uncommon occurence for a submarine 
to come up leisurely, halt a ship, put out a boat, send a crew 



8 WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

aboard and place a bomb with a time fuse, return to the submarine 
and after the destruction of the ship open fire on the passengers 
in the small boats. 

Mr. Hinsdale Acts 

Warring on the U-boats in the Seven Seas was an impossi- 
bility. It would require thousands of destroyers and the gain 
might be little. Mr. Hinsdale saw the futility of trying to search 
out the submarines and while the Cabinet was worrying over the 
situation and while Thomas A. Edison, Hudson Maxim and other 
great scientists were cudgelling their brains night and day to 
obtain an instrument that would defeat the submarine, Mr. Hins- 
dale turned to more practical methods. He thought the menace 
must be blocked with the means that were then at hand rather 
than by waiting for some miracle worker that might be discovered 
when it was too late. 

Hence his letter to President Wilson, dated May 2. This 
read : — 

"His Excellency the President of the United States : — 

"The reported destruction of a German U-boat recently by a 
shot direct at the exposed periscope is not an unreasonable con- 
clusion if the shot was an explosive shell. 

"A six or eight inch shell exploded on the water immediately 
over a submarine boat lying several feet below the surface would 
effectually put the submarine out of commission, due to the down- 
ward thrust of a column of non-compressible water with the effect 
of a bar of steel, if suddenly forced downward on top of the sub- 
marine boat. 

"In this connection I would suggest that the present policy 
of feeding valuable ships and their human lives and cargoes one 
by one to German monsters without quid pro quo of German U- 
boats in return is wrong in theory and procedure. 

"This method of dealing with the problem without a systematic 
return warfare on the submarine is contrary to good policy, as the 
U-boats continue their depredations practically unmolested. 

"A perfectly successful war on these German pirates could be 
waged by sending your freight and other steamers through the 
infested zone in fleets of twenty or more vessels convoyed by as 
many or more scout cruisers and torpedo boat destroyers disposed 
on either side of the fleet. 

"At night the surface should be swept by numerous search- 
lights and day or night a shell or two should be dropped on any 
suspicious appearance indicating the vicinity of a periscope. 

"This will act somewhat as a warning and as a deterrent to 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 9 

active operations of U-boats. Should an attack be made and a 
torpedo launched a thousand eyes in all parts of the convoy and 
fleet are watching for indications of the passage of a torpedo 
through the water and its attendant wake will indicate its 
direction. Shells exploded in line of its advance would perhaps 
divert it from its intended course and other shells having been 
dropped as nearly as possible above the submarine if submerged 
or if on the surface, its destruction will have been accomplished. 

"If a large number of submarines are encountered all of them 
will have been exposed to the destructive effect of shell fire. 

"In the event that a successful torpedo should be launched 
the whereabouts of the U-boat will be disclosed and a dozen shots 
directed to its destruction and an injured ship will have ready help 
for passengers and crew. 

"An increased number of enemy submarines will under such 
circumstances insure their destruction all the more and in a com- 
paratively short time the present U-boat menace to navigation 
will have become a legend with some of my former dealings with 
pirates. 

"Revealed by the late 

"Cornelius Van Tromp." 

Cornelius Van Tromp was the name of an old Dutch admiral 
in the seventeenth century who swept the seas of the pirates who 
were raiding the Dutch merchantmen. 

The President Acts 

President Wilson received this communication the very next 
morning, May 3, while the destructive submarine campaign was 
perhaps the most vital subject under discussion at Washington. 

On May 3, Mr. Hinsdale wrote his second letter to the Presi- 
dent. It read : 

"His Excellency the President of the United States: — 

"Hunting the German submarine is comparatively easy. The 
quarry, when found, is easily killed. 

"You cannot hunt them successfully through the Seven Seas 
with cruisers or with seaplanes. Battle ships and dreadnoughts 
are unsuitable for the purpose. As I revealed to you yesterday, 
your quarry must be baited to draw it within killing distance. A 
single ship with a single gun is not enough. Seaplanes should aid 
the convoy. 

"Ten submarines could not sink two vessels of the fleet I 
described to you yesterday. If they attempted it nine out of the 
ten submarines would be easily destroyed. 

"Revealed by the late 

"Cornelius Van Tromp." (He with the broom). 



10 WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

Following the Advice 

Pursuing his policy of information gained from actual know- 
ledge of the submarine and its limitations, Mr. Hinsdale wrote 
again to President Wilson on May 4, 1917. All of his communica- 
tions carried as a subject title the phrase "The Submarine or 
German U-boat Menace." This letter read: — 

"His Excellency the President of the United States : — 

"On May 3, I revealed to you that the hunting and killing of 
German submarines with the means you have at hand should be 
regarded as a sport and not as a fearsome task. 

"The public should be regaled with cheerful tales of the 
prowess and skill of the huntsmen and not with shivering dread of 
an encounter with cowardly pirates who will make your people 
'walk the plank' if they do not win, or fight to the death. 

"Your allies should stop the rat holes whence the pirates come 
and then your task, or sport, as you choose to make it, will soon 
be over. 

"Revealed by the late 

"Cornelius Van Tromp." 

Here was the first suggestion of an offensive against the 
great ports at Ostend and Zeebrugge, on the Flanders coast, 
whence the German submarine raiders were continually sweeping 
out into the North Sea and thence after the Alied Ships. The 
British navy soon thereafter began its preparations for raids on 
these two outlets. The heroic old Vindictive led three block ships 
to the Zeebruggee Mole and then engaged the Mole and shore 
batteries while the block ships went directly into the entrance 
of the Bruges Canal and there sank themselves. This contributed 
not only one of the most effective means of choking off the 
raiders but also wrote one of the most heroic stories of the war. 
Later the Vindictive led the block ships into Ostend Harbor. 

Writing Again 

On May 8, 1917, Mr. Hinsdale, following up his communica- 
tions, wrote again to President Wilson. 

His Excellency the President of the United States : — 

"In my revelations to you of recent date I suggested a fleet 
of vessels as a bait for submarines to bring the game within killing 
distance of the convoy of hunters. 

"Five or seven such vessels may be properly convoyed by your 
fast cruisers and torpedo boat destroyers with economy and the 
number of vessels in the fleet may be increased when you see the 
success of the sport as I see it. And thus you may see and your 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 11 

public will see that you do not need to wait for your modern 
miracle workers to delay your action. Instant results are de- 
manded by present conditions and you have all the means at your 
command. 

"Revealed by the late 

"Cornelius Van Tromp." 

Believing that he might just as well reveal his identity now Mr. 
Hinsdale sent the following letter to President Wilson, dated Ma} r 
22, 1917 :— 

"His Excellency the President of the United States : — 
"Lest we forget, and as a souvenir, I send you herewith a 
certified copy of 'Revelations' in re 'The Submarine or German 
U-boat Menace,' dated May 2, 1917. Faithfully yours. 

"(Signed) W. R. HINSDALE." 

Mr. Hinsdale also mailed copies of the Presidential communi- 
cation to Secretary Daniels, Mr. Balfour, at Washington ; Lloyd 
George and to the British Admiralty direct. Secretary Daniels 
acknowledged the receipt of the communications in the following 
letter, dated May 23, 1917, and written on his official stationery: — 

"My Dear Mr. Hinsdale: — I have received your letters and 
thank you for sending me a copy of the articles you have sent to 
the President on 'The Submarine or U-boat Menace.' 
"Sincerely yours, 

"(Signed) JOSEPHUS DANIELS." 

Effect of Shells 

Mr. Hinsdale wrote to President Wilson as follows under 
date of May 28, 1917 :— 

"His Excellency the President of the United States : — 

"In my communication to you under date of May 2, 1917, I 
wrote: — 'A six or eight inch shell exploded on the water immedi- 
ately over a submarine boat lying several feet below the surface 
would effectually put the submarine out of commission, due to the 
downward thrust of a column of non-compressible water with the 
effect of a bar of steel if suddenly forced downward on top of 
the submarine boat.' 

"Many times it serves to break and open riveted joints and 
the submarine quickly fills with water, drowning all within. 

"If the stroke is near the end the boat will be suddenly tilted, 
and in nearly all cases will spin over and over, mixing the crew 
up with the machinery, maiming and killing some or all of the 
occupants. A similar spinning and breaking of riveted joints will 
be the result if the shell is exploded close alongside the boat. 



12 WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

"A submarine two or three hundred feet in length furnishes 
a substantial mark for undersea exploding shells, and their use, 
under conditions I described to you, will render the U-boat 
operations too hazardous to last. 

Faithfully yours, 

"(Signed) W. R. HINSDALE." 

Soon after the receipt of the fourth letter by President Wilson 
the first American destroyer flotilla was sent to Europe. It arrived 
in Queenstown May 16, and the young officer in command, when 
asked when he would be ready to go to sea, promptly replied : — 

"We are ready now, sir." 

Within a few weeks the new convoy plan was working well. 
Success was apparent immediately. The early reports from Admiral 
Sims read like fairy tales. Marine insurance dropped twenty-five 
per cent. The sinkings began to dwindle fast. April was the 
biggest month in the history of the submarine campaign, the 
second month after Germany had declared her ruthless campaign 
for all the seas. In March 61 vessels of over 1,600 tons were sunk, 
28 of under 16,000 tons and 37 fishing vessels. In April 132 first class 
ships paid the toll, 52 second class and 41 fishers. The first week 
of May took 24 first class steamers and 22 second class. Then the 
sinkings decreased, 18 first class for each of the next three weeks 
and 5, 9 and 1 of the second class, respectively. 

The Figures 

There were 115 first and second class vessels sunk in May, as 
against 184 in April. June saw a further falling off to 85 first class 
ships, 25 second class, or 110 in all. Eleven fishers were lost, but 
these were out all the time, practically without protection, for 
their value was nothing as compared to the more vital transports. 
In July the new convoy system was working perfectly and the 
rush of American troops was beginning to shape up. Only 82 first 
and second class vessels were sunk in that month ; only 80 in 
August, the sinkings of the big ships dropping off more than 
twenty-five per cent. By September the troop transportation was 
well under way. Month by month the loss was scaled down, until 
by January, 1918, the submarine was little feared by the soldiers 
in the convoys. That month only 46 first and second class vessels, 
all of them supply ships, were sunk and seven fishers. And 
America then was using the gigantic German liners taken over. 
Even Germany's own figures, published to represent the greatest 
loss, showed a falling off of nearly thirty-three per cent, in sinkings 
between April and October. 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 13 

On December 8, 1918, Secretary Daniels told a happy story of 
the navy's participation in the war. His report said : — 

"The 'adoption' of the new convoy system was suggested by 
President Wilson shortly after our entrance into the war, and this 
convoy system was our major operation during the war and will in 
the future stand as a monument to the greatest and most difficult 
troop transportation effort ever conducted across seas, an anti- 
submarine convoy and escort system, the results of which have 
surpassed even the most sanguine expectations." 

Mr. Hinsdale makes the claim only to having adapted the con- 
voy system to the limitations of the submarine. No naval officer 
makes any such claim and the "adoption" of the scheme was sug- 
gested by the President, as Secretary 'Daniels' letter shows. Ex- 
plaining why he thought the limitations of the submarine were 
not understood, Mr. Hinsdale said: — 

"The German U-boat was a new and unfamiliar foe never be- 
fore encountered in the world's history of wars, and while the con- 
voy system of defense against the aggressiveness of surface fight- 
ing ships was old in the navigation of the seas, its adoption by 
the department at the time had not been deemed practicable owing 
to unfamiliarity with the limitations of the submarine boat, con- 
sequently the submarines for all practical purposes for the time 
being became surface boats and had a perfectly free hand in 
dealing with their victims. 

The Undersea Exploding Shell 

"The British navy had for some time been developing an 'un- 
dersea exploding shell' for use in their patrol system, but this 
availed them little until used in connection with the new convoy 
system. 

"On May 2, 1917, after reading the report of Lloyd George on 
the sinkings of vessels by the German submarines for the month 
of April and realizing that the United States had been at war with 
Germany for nearly a month and yet no effective steps had been 
taken by our Navy Department nor by the navies of any of the 
Allies for a systematic warfare against the submarine, I wrote the 
Van Tromp revelations to induce the establishment of a new 
convoy system of defense. 

"The practices of the Allies up to that time were generally 
understood and reported as that of 'patrolling,' as it was called, 
here and there at random, looking for U-boats everywhere except 
where they were doing the most serious damage, our vessels were 
being sent through the barred zone singly with instructions to com- 



WILLIAM RUSSELL HINSDALE 
In 189S, Date of Organizing Lake Submarine Co. 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 15 

manders to try to dodge the submarines by steering a zig-zig 
course, developing their speed as much as possible. If two ships 
were in communicating distance of each other, one being attacked 
the commander of the other ship was under orders to escape if 
possible, leaving the passengers and crew to perish under the 
piratical attack, instead of going to the assistance of the stricken 
vessel. During this time the Navy Department was busily engag- 
ed in testing many secret and trivial devices with which to fight 
the mysterious and insidious foe. 

"Under these circumstances the complete system of warfare 
described in the Van Tromp revelations was written by me and 
read by James L. Webb and A. D. Latchford in my offices in 
Newark and then forwarded to the President, the first letter being 
mailed at five o'clock in the afternoon of May 2, and the remaining 
letters mailed according to their respective dates." 

Who Mr. Hinsdale Is 

Mr. Hinsdale is known from one end of the country to the 
other through his engineering work. In 1894 he suggested the 
Duwamish River improvements for the State of Washington, 
which were carried out as he had planned — filling the tide lands, 
widening and deeping the river, building miles and miles of docks 
for manufacturing concerns, shipbuilding concerns, airaplane plants, 
steel mills, brick yards and sawmills. He was associated with 
William G. Fargo, president of the American Express Company, 
in the early 60's ; then with the late General Henry W. Slocum in 
the promotion of the Merchants' Union Express Company, later 
consolidated with the American Express Company. He was 
instrumental in the checking of the great Chicago fire, where he 
was present from first to last and working with Colonel Starr on 
the staff of General Phil Sheridan, planned the blowing up of a 
number of private houses. After the fire he came to New York 
and became interested in the construction of a railroad from New- 
town to Babylon, L. I., to form a connection between the north 
and south lines. In the summer of 1873 he submitted to Alexander 
T. Stewart a plan to reclaim the "great barrens," as the Hempstead 
plains were then known. Mr. Hinsdale supervised the build- 
ing of many miles of roads and the construction of Garden City, 
with its hotel, cathedral and schools on the cathedral foundation. 
In the spring of 1880 he began the designing and construction of 
the great system of piping steam through the streets of New York, 
a method which today furnishes much of the heat and power for 
the great skyscrapers and other buildings in the lower part of the 
city. In 1888 he organized the American Tungsten Mining and 
Milling Company for the production of material for use in the 



16 WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

manufacture of self-hardening steel. And in 1895 he organized the 
Lake Submarine Company and was managing director. It was 
his knowledge of submarines that led to his adaptation of the 
new convoy system to drive the submarine from the sea. 

THE VAN TROMP "REVELATIONS" 

The "Revelations" (Cornelius Van Tromp, the noted Pirate 
Killer of the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century), dis- 
closed a specific adaptation of the convoy system into an aggres- 
sive warfare against the German submarine and a perfect defense 
for our transports and other ships in their passage through the 
barred zone and, by a prompt and in a unique manner, brought 
this aggressive and defensive method of submarine warfare to the 
notice of the Commander-in-Chief of our Navy, as well as the 
Navy Department of England on the afternoon of the second of 
May, 1917, while the world stood aghast and helpless before the 
frightful destruction of life and property by the unhindered pirates 
of Germany. 

The British Admiralty Board says that the new convoy system, 
which played so important a part in frustrating the enemy's designs 
and in securing a safe passage for the army of the United States, 
carries with it a new science of accuracy and skill and without its 
loyal co-operation, the enemy's submarine campaign must inevita- 
bly have attained its object. 

10 Downing Street, Whitehall, S. W., London, 

June 28, 1917. 
Dear Sir : — 

I am desired by the Prime Minister to thank you for your 
courtesy in sending him the copies of your correspondence dealing 
with the submarine menace, together with the press extract on 
the same subject. 

Yours faithfully, 

(Signed) F. L. STEVENSON. 
W. R. Hinsdale, Esq. 

In his address to the Rear Admirals and other officers sum- 
moned to hear him on board the Warship Pennsylvania, President 
Wilson disclaimed any technical knowledge that would enable him 
to say what steps should be taken to overcome the submarine 
menace. 

His address was confidential and delivered August 11th, 1917, 
on the quarter-deck of the battleship, to Admiral Mayo and the 
officers of the fleet, assembled at Yorktown, Va. 

"I have come here to say that I do not care where it comes 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 17 

from. I do not care whether it comes from the youngest officer or 
the oldest, but I want the officers of this Navy to have the dis- 
tinction of saying how this war is going to be won. I am saying 
that I want the youngest and most modest youngster in the service 
to tell us what we ought to do, if he knows what it is, if the 
oldest does not. 

I wish that I could think and had the brains to think in the 
terms of marine warfare. I, for my part, am sorry to play so 
peaceful a part in the business as I myself am obliged to play. 

Well ! Nothing was ever done so systematically as nothing is 
being done now. America has always boasted that she could find 
men to do anything. She is the prize amateur nation of the world. 
Now, when it comes to doing new things and doing them well, 
I will back the amateur against the professional every time." 

PARAGRAPHS FROM THE WORLD'S WORK, IN "THE 
VICTORY AT SEA," ADMIRAL SIMS' OWN STORY 

(Copyrighted) 

"In the month of April, 1917, I had found the British Officials 
just about as distressed as the Germans were jubilant. 

"Already the latter in sinking merchant ships had successes 
which almost equalled their own predictions; no adequate means 
of defense against the submarines had been devised, and the chiefs 
of the British Navy made no attempts to disguise their apprehen- 
sion for the future. 

"It is not too much to say that the responsibility for the safety 
of the British Empire rested upon Admiral Jellicoe's shoulders. 
As First Sea Lord, Jellicoe controlled the operations, not only of 
the Grand Fleet, but also of the entire British navy ; he had no 
superior officer. 

"After the usual greetings, Admiral Jellicoe took a paper out 
of his drawer and handed it to me. It was a record of tonnage 
losses for the last few months. I was fairly astounded; I had 
never imagined anything so terrible and I expressed my conster- 
nation to Admiral Jellicoe. 

"Yes," he said, as quietly as though he were discussing the 
weather and not the future of the British Empire. "It is impossible 
for us to go on with the war if losses like this continue." 

"It looks as though the Germans were winning the war, I 
remarked. 

"They will win, unless we can stop these losses — and stop them 
soon," the Admiral replied. 

"Such was the atmosphere of gloom which prevailed in Allied 
Councils in April, 1917. 




The World's Work, Sims Own Story, Copyrighted Underwood & Underwood 

THE WAKE OF A TORPEDO 
This was the telltale sign which betrayed the presence of the submarine. 
It was a foamy disturbance, four or five feet wide, similar to that caused by the 
propeller of an ocean liner. As soon as the destroyer saw this wake, it ran up 
and dropped undersea exploding shells, at the end — obviously the place where 
the submarine was when the torpedo was fired. 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 19 

"For the greater part of 1917, the German people believed that 
their submarines could bar the progress of the American Armies. 
By March of 1918, they had awakened from this delusion. Not 
only was the American Army, millions strong, in process of forma- 
tion, but the alarming truth now dawned upon Germanic mind that 
they could be transported to Europe. 

"Does any sane person believe that we could have put two 
million Americans into France had the German submarines main- 
tained, until the Spring and Summer of 1918, the striking power 
which had been theirs in the Spring of 1917? Merely to state the 
question is to answer it. 

"In that same twelve months we had gained much experience 
which was exceedingly valuable when we began transporting 
troops. 

"The most efficacious protection to merchant shipping, the New 
Convoy, was similarly the greatest safeguard to our military trans- 
ports. Those methods which had been so successfully used in 
shipping food, munitions and materials were now used in shipping 
soldiers. 

"The sinking of a great transport with four or five thousand 
American boys on board, would have been a dreadful calamity and 
would have struck horror to the American people. 

"No such army movement had ever before been attempted. 
The discouraging forecast made by a brilliant British Naval 
authority in July, 1917, reflected the ideas of many military people 
on both sides of the ocean. 

"Admiral Von Man (German) took several submarines away 
from the trade routs and sent them into the transport zone, but 
they did not even succeed in attacking a single east-bound troop ship. 

"In March, 1918, it became apparent that the German sub- 
marine campaign had failed. The prospect that faced the Allied 
forces at that time, when compared with the conditions which had 
faced them in April, 1917, forms one of the most impressive con- 
trasts in history. In the first part of the earlier year the cause of 
the Allied Powers, and consequently the cause of Liberty through- 
out the world, had reached the point almost of desperation. On 
both land and sea the Germans seemed to hold the future in their 
hands. 

"The results which the German submarines could accomplish 
seemed at that time to be simply a matter of mathematical calcu- 
lation. The Germans figured that they could sink at least 1,000,000 
tons a month, completely cut off Great Britian's supplies of food 
and war materials, and thus end the war by October or November 
of 1918. 



20 WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

"The seas presented two impressive spectacles in those terrible 
months of April, May and June, 1917. One was the comparative 
ease with which the German submarines were sinking merchant 
vessels. 

"The Kaiser and his associates had figured that the war would 
end about July 1st or August 1st, and English officials with whom 
I came in contact placed the date at November 1, 1917, always pro- 
vided of course that some method were not found for checking the 
submarines. 

"How then could we defeat the submarines? In other words, 
how could we win the war? 

"What was this strange new type of warfare that was bringing 
the Allied cause to its knees? Nothing like it had ever been 
known in recorded time. Nothing like it has been foreseen." 

Confirmation By Vice-Admiral Sims 

(New York World, April 8, 1919) 

"In April, 1917, the Central Powers were winning the war, 
whether you knew it or not. There were 700,000 to 800,000 tons 
of shipping being lost each month, and we did not know how to 
stop it. We had to adopt a new method. We established first 
the new convoy system ; second, the depth charge ("Undersea 
Exploding Shell). The new convoy system might have been put 
into operation sooner than it was, but it had undergone a period 
of incorrect information." 

Reprinted from the New York Herald. Copyrighted. 

"CONFESSIONS OF A U-BOAT CAPTAIN" 

One of Germany's Master Pirates, Captain of the U-71, Makes A 

Complete Confession. Restrictions Forbid the Publication 
of the German Captain's Name 

"After the New Convoy system had been developed, the 
American troop ships were so very thoroughly protected, that we 
simply had to leave them alone. Time and again we sighted them 
and would have made an attack had it not been for the very power- 
ful escort. Naturally I would have been very glad to get a troop 
ship. I did everything possible to approach close enough to put 
out a torpedo or two, but I could not. 

"There is a vast difference between being under fire on land 
and being under fire under water. Even if you are wounded' on 
land, you have some chance, but if the submarine is wounded it is 
finished and badly finished. 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 21 

"We always feared two destroyers that were in supporting 
distance of each other a great deal more than twice as much as one 
destroyer. Any skipper who attacked a convoy that was 
adequately escorted, that is had the right number of destroyers, 
ought to have a medal for bravery and a court martial for risking 
his own ship and crew. 

"I believe that the very best defensive measures against sub- 
marines are destroyers and aircraft patrol. 

"The submarines giving up the chase meant giving up the 
ghost also." 

With blunt frankness, the Captain of the U-71 summed up the 
entire submarine situation thus : "The war ended just in time to 
save a few good U-boat skippers and their entire crews from 
destruction." 

The Germans were unable to record a single successful troop 
ship attack on some seventeen thousand vessels that cleared from 
the United States with their hundreds of thousands of soldiers. 

(Editorial N. Y. World, May 4th, 1917) 

"The sinister aspect of the U-boat situation is not the losses 
of this week or last week or last month, but the fact that after 
more than two years of unceasing effort on the part of the British 
Admiralty no adequate method has been discovered of meeting the 
menace. Today the submarines are far more effective than they 
were at the beginning and no means of combating the menace has 
yet proved successful." 

The Saturday Evening Post states that the new convoy system 
was instituted upon the insistance of the Americans, and submarine 
warfare changed from the defensive warfare the British have been 
making to the offensive warfare the Americans demanded with 
the new convoy system. 

The American contention was that the patrol system of 
seeking submarines was not getting results, and that the real way 
to make the German U-boat warfare inoperative was to bring the 
U-boats to the ships rather than to send the ships out to find 
them. In other words, by concentrating the prizes the submarines 
were after into convoys and guarding these convoys the subma- 
rines would be obliged to come where the ships were instead of 
lying in wait for them to come one by one. 

It is a matter of public record that in April and early in May 
the enormous loss of life and property by reason of the U-boats 
was effected by lying at will on the surface and sinking 
their helpless victims with their guns instead of torpedoes. Some- 



22 WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

times they were thus engaged at their leisure for hours at a time. 
One oil tanker required nearly four hours of this surface warfare 
before the tanker was finally overcome and sunk. 

It was a common occurrence that some of the crew of a sub- 
marine boarded, and in some cases deliberately placed a bomb 
with a lighted fuse in position to sink the ship and leisurely 
returned to their submarine on the surface and afterward enter- 
tained their crews by deliberately sinking the small boats and 
their passengers with shots from their exposed deck guns. All 
these things could not have occurred under the New Convoy 
System of the Van Tromp Revelations. 

Newark, New Jersey, April 7th, 1919. 
Hon. Lloyd George, Premier of England, Paris, France. 

I feel sure that you have marked your calendar of great events 
the second day of May, 1917, as the turning point of the War, 
because you know that on the first day of May, 1917, at Washing- 
ton, the despatching of American troops to European battlefields 
was bitterly opposed by the American General Staff on account 
of the German Submarine Menace. 

British naval experts accompanying the Commission headed 
by Foreign Secretary Balfour were urging the importance of 
finding some means of staying the destruction of the merchant 
marine of the world, carrying munitions and supplies to the Allied 
armies. 

The French naval representatives were fully in accord with 
the pessimistic view their British ally held, unless some method 
was speedily devised to curtail the sinking of cargo ships in the 
German submarine zone. Lord Percy said the losses were greater 
than can be replaced. 

The 'Van Tromp Revelations" of the second day of May, 1917, 
answered all arguments of the American General Staff against 
the sending of American troops to France, and the war was won. 
Faithfully yours, 

W. R. HINSDALE. 

The Westminister Gazette Says American 
Conquers U-boats 

Life of Submarine War is Measured, says London Paper 

London, May 26, 1917. — The Westminister Gazette publishes 
a message from a correspondent, who says the submarine menace 
is being mastered by a simple method, devised by an American. 

"It is giving away no secret," the correspondent writes, "to 
say that the method, which is reputed to be infallible, requires 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 23 

only a little time to come into full effect and wear the German 
submarines out. It is a model of simplicity. This resourceful 
American has worked along independent lines." 

Lloyd George says : "By a method which is simplicity itself 
we already have the life of the U-boat campaign measured. Watch 
the returns." 

Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the British Admiralty, reported 
the result of the adoption of the American Convoy System in 
place of the British patrol plan as follows : 

"During the first part of the German unrestricted submarine 
war, fifty percent of the losses ocurred more than fifty miles from 
land. Today (March 6th, 1918) the losses outside the fifty mile 
limit have fallen to one per cent. 

There is a growing reluctance on the part of the German 
crews to put to sea. The cause for their reluctance is obvious." 

The Right Honorable Arthur James Balfour said, "Things 
were dark when I took that trip to America. The submarines 
were constantly on my mind. I could think of nothing but the 
number of ships they were sinking. At that time it certainly 
looked as though we were going to lose the war." 

Newark, N. J., Feb. 4, 1919. 
Hon. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, 

Washington. 
My Dear Mr. Daniels: — 

I am about to remove the ban of secrecy as to authorship 
and purpose of writing the "Van Tromp Revelations" addressed 
to the President, as commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the 
United States, and shall expect your co-operation. 

Hon. Edward W. Gray, M. C, Representative from New 
Jersey proposing the introduction of a Joint Resolution in Congress 
recognizing my services, I have requested him to call upon you 
for a brief statement of facts of Historical interest in this con- 
nection merely. 

Faithfully yours, 

W. R. HINSDALE. 

Navy Department 

Washington, March 3, 1919. 
My Dear Mr. Gray: 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter 
of recent date forwarding certain correspondence from Mr. W. 
R. Hinsdale claiming that he was responsible for the Government's 
adoption of the new convoy system. 



y 



24 WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

Mr. Hinsdale's letters were considered by the Department. 

As regards the convoy carrier, there was some question as to 
the proper method to employ to obtain the best results. By send- 
ing ships in convoys, the vessels of which are necessarily obliged 
to proceed at the same speed, much time was lost, and it was 
estimated that, neglecting the loss from submarines, a reduction 
of about twenty per cent, in the total carrying capacity of ships 
would be caused by the adoption of the new convoy system. 

There was some difficulty, on account of the scarcity of suitable 
vessels for escort work. After a careful consideration of this 
subject, however, and after a study of the operations of our Allies, 
it was decided to dispatch cargo carriers in convoys also. 

The Department appreciated the patriotic motives which 
inspired Mr. Hinsdale to make these suggestions. 

(Signed) JOSEPHUS DANIELS. 
The Hon. Edward Gray, M. C. 

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. 

Newark, New Jersey, April 7th, 1919. 
His Excellency the President of the United States, Paris, France. 

My dear Air. President : I am enclosing you a leaflet setting 
forth the authorship and purpose of writing the "Van Tromp 
Revelations," May 2nd, 1917. 

I wish to direct your attention to the Leaflet as showing 
reasonable cause for delay of more than forty days after war was 
declared against the Empire of Germany before the Destroyers 
were used in a "perfectly successful war" on the German pirates, 
the success of which prompted Vice-Admiral Sims to write from 
London, April 10, 1918, "We will win or lose according to whether 
we beat the submarine or it beats us; we must depend chiefly 
upon destroyers for this. Destroyers on this side are worth their 
weight in gold." 

Personal responsibility for the delay should not rest upon the 
President nor upon any subordinate in the Navy "Department. 
Faithfully yours, 

W. R. HINSDALE. 

Our Destroyer Flotilla was immediately dispatched to Queens- 
town, arriving on the 16th day of May, and forty days after our 
war with Germany began, reported as ready to commence opera- 
tions under the inspiration of the Van Tromp Revelations; con- 
tinued success followed. 

The early reports from Admiral Sims read like a page from 
the Van Tromp Revelations, and confirm the accuracy of the 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 25 

conclusions therein stated as to the conditions of a perfectly- 
successful U-boat warfare, and under these conditions Marine 
Insurance was soon reduced 25 per cent. 

In May, 1917, the Japanese, jointly with English vessels, were 
engaged in patrolling at various points in the Mediterranean Sea 
with little success in their search for German U-boats. 

Soon after the receipt of the Van Tromp Revelations by Sir 
Arthur J. Balfour in Washington, the patrolling vessels in the 
Mediterranean were ordered to rendezous at Marseilles and convoy 
Merchant shipping in fleets, as the order stated, so long as the 
experiment proved a success. 

Jellicoe admits that no high sea convoy was got into operation 
till late in May, 1917, when a convoy passed successfully to 
England from Gilbralter, and the first homeward bound Atlantic 
convoy started May 24, 1917. 

Up to this date the "time honored" British convoys had been 
directed to protection from German Sea Raiders then infesting 
the high seas. Some of them were destroyed by British crusiers 
and many sought safety in ports of the United States and other 
neutral countries and were interned preventing their further 
damage to commerce. 

Prophecy and Fulfilment 

The remarkable accuracy of the predications set forth in the 
Van Tromp Revelations, adapting the Convoy System to aggres- 
sive warfare on the German U-boats, having been so com- 
pletely verified by evidence herewith from the reports of Rear 
Admiral Sims, Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord of the British 
Navy, Von Tirpitz, Grand Admiral of the German Navy, and the 
graphically stated confessions of the Master Pirate Captain of the 
German U-boat 71, prompts me to direct special attention of the 
reader to a comparison of paragraphs indicative of the through 
knowledge of the subject by the writer on that fateful second 
day of May, 1917, which has prompted Rear Admiral Sims to say, 
"All this time that we were seeking a solution of the submarine 
problem, we really had that solution in our hands." 

W. R. HINSDALE. 



By Alfred Von Tirpitz 
Grand Admiral of the German Navy 

"In 1916 our U-boats could play havoc among the enemy 
merchant ships like wolves among sheep ; later they had to fight 



26 WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

regular battles. A work of destruction had become a dangerous 
operation with many casualties. Americans turned the scale." 

From the report of The Ship Protective Committee of The 
Naval Consulting Board of the United States, consisting of twenty- 
four noted scientists, with Mr. Thomas A. Edison as President. 
Organized in 1915 

"There is no question that the most effective thing developed 
during the Great War for protecting vessels was the New Convoy 
System." 

"The safeguarding of vessels by torpedo-boat destroyers was 
very efficient and with a sufficient numbers of destroyers practi- 
cally complete immunity from submarine attack was had." 

ENGLAND WAS NEAR TO DEFEAT BY U-BOATS 

Analysis of conditions at that time 

Written by Glaucus, an Officer of high rank in the 

United States Navy 

Copyright by New York Herald 

THE NEW CONVOY SYSTEM 

England's great battle ships and cruiser fleet could not fight 
the submarine any more than a bulldog can fight a salmon. The 
submarine will not stay and fight. Furthermore it is more than 
foolhardy for a big ship to remain in the vicinity of a submarine 
submerged, because the big ship cannot harm the submarine, as 
it cannot tell its location, and the big ship is helpless to avoid a 
torpedo when fired at short range. Once the submarine leaves 
the surface it disappears from sight, and despite all pretences to 
the contrary, it cannot be heard with any degree of accuracy or 
even reliability. 

Her First Weak Answer 

So battle ships and cruisers, the monarchs of the sea, are help- 
less before the submarine in the same way that a prize fighter is 
helpless before a burglar with his automatic pistol drawn. The 
prize fighter cannot dodge a bullet. 

England's reply was characteristic of her past sea strategy 
developed through countless years of controlling the sea highways 
— a concentration of warships to fight the submarine at the foci 
of trade routes, but this method, although it had brought success 
to England in the past, did not do so in this case and the reason 
was that "an enemy which fights in the open can be met and 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 27 

defeated by superior surface force, but one that lurks in the depths 
of the sea cannot be subdued by those familiar means, but must 
be met by a new and more up to date method of attack." The 
patrol method was wasted effort, yet the Admiralty held to this 
method until forced by outside opinion to abandon it. 

The consequence was that England in attempting to apply 
the old principle of concentration of force against the submarine 
found herself face to face with failure and her population and army 
faced with starvation, and all bcause the Admiralty was attempting 
to apply a well known principle in the old way without appreciating 
that, although the principle was applicable, yet the method of its 
application was wrong, owing to the changed characteristics of 
its enemy, and it was not until American counsel was added upon 
our joining the war that the Admiralty at last agreed to throw 
overboard the patrol system and adopt the new convoy system. 

The British Admiralty's principle objection to convoy was that 
there were not enough of the proper types of warships to guard 
the convoys and that therefore submarines could concentrate and 
slaughter ships in convoy as wolves in a flock of sheep. This 
reason seemed sound in the British mind, but it was not, for the 
reason that the number of guards required was not as great as at 
first thought, and they soon found that many of the patrol war 
ships could be dispensed with and used to guard convoys. The 
new convoy system required careful planning to prevent contacts 
at sea at night or in fogs, but after all merchantmen were in 
convoy the risk of collision at sea was much less, for convoys 
travelling in one direction were given routes clear of those in 
another direction. 

England Finally Adopts the New Convoy System 

The underlying principle of the new convoy system may be ex- 
plained by saying that it "brought the mountain to Mahomet." 
Before its adoption England permitted about twenty-five hundred 
cargo ships to arrive singly into her ports and about the same 
number to depart singly. This made a procession of ships passing 
and repassing over the same narrow sea routes. What a wonder- 
ful chance for the submarine ! 

To protect this never ending procession small patrol vessels 
of many types had been scattered over these narrow waters and 
their duty had been to attack the submarine when sighted. In- 
sufficient numbers of patrols permitted ships to be torpedoed by 
the score weekly, while the patrol boats arrived only in time to 
rescue the crews after the ships had disappeared beneath the 
waves. 

While the German was torpedoing or sinking by gunfire the 



28 WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

unescorted merchantman he was in no danger, for it was impossihle 
for the few patrol boats to cover all the seas. It seemed therefore 
like play to the German. He was on the crest of the wave — 
winning — his morale was high. He saw the enemy's great ship sink 
without resistance. Should a patrol appear on the horizon, the 
submarine quietly passed from the insecurity of the surface to the 
more hospitable depths of the ocean, where no eye or ear could 
detect him. 

Playing the New Game! 

But with the new convoy system — Gott straffe the man who 
proposed it ! 

This was entirely different from the game the submarines had 
with so much joy been playing. There existed now a very strong 
element of danger to the submarine. Besides, it put the subma- 
rine always on the defensive. There was seldom an opportunity 
to practise the offensive. The long suspense which the personnel 
endured while attacking a convoy, when only one person knew 
what was going on outside, and that one the captain at the peri- 
scope, began to gradually tell on the men. After each return to 
Germany they blessed their stars to be back and dreaded the com- 
ing of the day when they must again take part in those long dreaded 
attacks, when any moment an undersea exploding shell might 
destroy them. Many of their companions never returned, and this 
they could not help knowing. The vein of yellow began to grow 
and when the victories on land by the Allies began to be under- 
stood by the German people, this yellow streak again widened and 
suddenly we were shown the pitiful sight of a nation fully 
equipped in material giving in on account of a collapse of the 
morale in its personnel — not only the fighting men but of the 
nation behind them. 

From the first day that this new method of convoying ships 
was adopted it was an unqualified success in defeating the sub- 
marine campaign. By August 1, 1917, more than 10,000 ships had 
been convoyed, with losses of only one half of 1 per cent. Up 
to that same date not a single ship which had left North American 
ports in convoy had been lost. By August 11th, 261 ships had been 
sent in convoy from North American ports, and of these only one 
had fallen a prey to the submarines. The new convoy gave few 
opportunities for encounters with submarines. I have already said 
that the great value of this system as a protection to shipping was 
that it compelled the underwater boats to fight their deadliest 
enemies, the destroyers, every time they tried to sink merchant 
ships in convoy, and they did not attempt this often on account 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 29 

of the danger. There were destroyers commanders who spent 
months upon the open sea, convoying huge aggregations of cargo 
vessels, without even once seeing a submarine. To a great extent 
the new convoy system did its work in the same way that the 
Grand Fleet performed its indispensable service — silently, un- 
obtrusively, making no dramatic bids for popular favor, and 
industriously plodding on, day after day, and month after month. 
All this time the world had its eyes fixed upon the stirring events 
of the Western Front, almost unconscious of the existence of 
the forces that made those land operations possible. Yet a few 
statistics eloquently disclose the part played by the new convoy 
system in winning the war. In the latter months of the struggle 
from 91 to 92 per cent, of Allied shipping sailed in convoys. The 
losses in these convoys were less than 1 per cent. And this figure 
includes the ships lost after the dispersal of the convoys : in 
convoys actually under destroyer escort the losses were less than 
one half of 1 per cent. 

Up to the time of the Armistice, despite all the assistance 
rendered to the navies by the best scientific brains of the world, 
no sure means had been found of keeping track of the submarine 
once he submerged. The new convoy system was, therefore, our 
only method of bringing him into action." 

The Revelations of the late Cornelius Van Tromp settled the 
status of the submarine for war purposes, showing that capital 
ships and transports need not fear submarines when under convoy 
of destroyers. 

The limitations of the submarine boat, as shown by the recent 
loss of a large modern submarine of the British Navy with fifty- 
two officers and men when making a practice dive, are disclosed 
in the "Chartless Course of the Submarine." 

The Chartless Course of the Submarine Boat 

Lying on the surface, the submarine boat has the stability 
and buoyancy of a surface boat of the same lines and weight. 
It is amenable to the forces and physical laws governing the 
surface vessel buffeted by the winds and waves, but when sub- 
merged, new laws intervene and the limitations of the undersea 
boat become apparent. 

It cannot lie at rest answering to the winds and waves as it did 
while on the surface, but must have an uninterrupted motion 
through a succession of impulses from its engines and propellers, 
directed by its steering and diving rudders. It brooks no delay 
on the part of its propellers. 



30 WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 

It is obvious that in the construction of a submarine boat it is 
impracticable to so build it and locate engines and other machinery, 
storage batteries, ballast, supplies, etc., that its centre of gravity 
shall coincide with its centre of form, therefore to keep it on a 
comparatively even keel fore and aft, the diving rudders must be 
continually manipulated, as the tendency of the heaviest end to 
sink must be continually overcome by the diving rudders and un- 
interrupted forward motion of the submerged boat. Thus the 
course of the submerged boat viewed horizontally will be a suc- 
cession of waves and not a level line, although the water may be 
comparatively still. 

The "undersea exploding shell," first particularly described in 
the Van Tromp Revelations, would, if exploded within a short 
distance from the submerged boat, either above, below or along- 
side, disable its engines, rudders, propellers, one or all of them 
checking its forward motion, when the heavier end would immedi- 
ately begin to sink, and the commander and crew could not even 
bring their boat to the surface for surrender, but must sink to the 
bottom of the sea with no escape possible. If the ocean at that 
place should be sufficiently deep, the sides of the subermine would 
be crushed in by pressure unless the boat should perhaps be 
protected from collapse by reason of its having been filled with 
water through the breaking of rivetted joints : in either case 
the officers and crew must suffer a horrible death. Cases have 
been noted from salvaged submarines where the occupants had 
evidently fought with each other in their madness preceding the 
catastrophe. 

This, the ghastly sequel to the Van Tromp Revelations. 

Atlantic Coast Defense 

His Excellency The President of the United States : — 

February 15, 1918. 
By the Author of the "Van Tromp Revelations" in re 
The German Submarine Menace 
Sir:— 

It is not generally understood that our Atlantic coast is 
peculiarly adapted for defense against attacks by submarines 
owing to the comparatively shallow water for a considerable 
distance from the shore. The depth increases on an average of 
only seven and one-half feet to the mile. 

The bottom is very even from North to South, excepting at 
the mouths of rivers, harbors and estuaries, and is composed of a 
hard white or gray sand extending from Newfoundland to the 



WHO WON THE GREAT WAR? 31 

Florida Keys, and off shore to the Gulf Stream, with the excep- 
tions noted. 

Under these conditions an enemy U-boat cannot readily 
submerge by diving, near enough inshore to have used its guns 
against coast cities, with serious effect. The transparent waters 
permit the defending vessels and aeroplanes to locate and destroy 
the enemy submarine, with great precision, as the U-boat cannot 
sink to the obscurity of deep water. 

With harbor defenses our Atlantic coast is practically immune 
from U-boat raids. 

The reported increase in the size of the German submarines 
recently built only serves to accentuate the immunity claimed — 
they are as easily killed as the smaller submarines. 

Faithfully yours, 

W. R. HINSDALE. 

Note : — An impressive verification of statements contained in 
the foregoing letter was furnished when the crew of American 
submarine S-5 executed their "Crash Dive," fifty-five miles off 
Cape Henlopen, from which they were rescued September 3, 1920, 
after being held in great peril head downward in the sand beneath 
the Atlantic ocean for nearly two days. 



Printed By 

F. W. WEAVER & CO. 

West Hoboken, N. J. 



(A 



mm 



V/:iirsMAu.,a.W. K 

27th. September, 1917. 



Dear Sir, 

I am desired by the 
Prime Minister to acknowledge 
the receipt of your letter of 
the 8th. instant, and to say 
that the matter will receive 
attention. 

Yours faithfully, 



?/Ttv 



Yf.E. Hinsdale, Esq., 

W92 




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